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Any Measurable Benefits?
RICHARD PODPIERA*
We explore the relationship between banking sector performance and the quality
of regulation and supervision as measured by compliance with the Basel Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP). Using BCP assessment
results for 65 countries and 1998–2002 panel data for other variables, we find a
significant positive impact of higher compliance with BCP on banking sector per-
formance, as measured by nonperforming loans and net interest margin, after con-
trolling for the level of development of the economy and the financial system and
macroeconomic and structural factors. [JEL G21, G28]
F
ollowing the series of crises in the 1990s, intensified attention to financial
sector vulnerabilities has led to the adoption of a number of financial sector
standards at the international level.1 The Basel Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision (BCP), introduced in 1997 by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, are one of the most important standards, largely because of
the dominant position banks have in many financial systems as well as the poten-
tially serious macroeconomic consequences of banking instability.2
*Richard Podpiera is an Economist, IMF Monetary and Financial Systems Department. The author is
grateful to Adolfo Barajas, Patricia Brenner, Martin C ˇihák, Udaibir S. Das, Gilda Fernandez, Plamen
Iossifov, Matthew Jones, Mark O’Brien, Jir ˇí Podpiera, Marc Quintyn, Mark Stone, Jan Willem van der
Vossen, participants of a Monetary and Financial Systems Department seminar, and two anonymous ref-
erees for useful comments. Kalin Tintchev provided research assistance.
1A compendium highlighting the 12 key standards for sound financial systems can be found at the
Financial Stability Forum website (www.fsforum.org).
2A review of the Basel Core Principles has commenced recently.
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been lead-
ing the BCP compliance assessments, mostly in the context of the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP).3 The BCP assessments have been among the most
rigorous, with detailed Core Principles Methodology, two assessors conducting
each assessment, and a thorough review of the draft assessment to ensure consis-
tency. Arrangements with cooperating supervisory agencies and central banks have
ensured the participation of experienced experts in the assessments.
The introduction of international financial standards and the first assessment
results have understandably generated interest in exploring the relationship
between the observance of standards and the functioning of the financial sector.
Recent work includes papers by Christofides, Mulder, and Tiffin (2003), who stud-
ied the impact of the observance of a variety of standards on spreads and ratings;
Das, Quintyn, and Chenard (2004), who explored the link between financial sec-
tor soundness and regulatory governance; and Glennerster and Shin (2003), who
focused on the effects of transparency on borrowing costs.
Despite the considerable attention the BCP has received in FSAPs and other
IMF work, there is limited evidence about the relationship between compliance
with the BCP and performance of the banking system. An initial attempt to
explore this link was offered by Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001). Their
paper presented an empirical examination of the relationship between compliance
with BCP (measured by a BCP noncompliance indicator constructed from the
results of BCP assessments) and nonperforming loan (NPL) ratios and spreads
between lending and risk-free rates. Their results suggested that BCP noncom-
pliance had no direct effect either on the level of NPLs or on the level of lending
spread, but that it could influence credit risk and soundness indirectly through its
interaction with other macroeconomic and banking sector factors. The analysis
provided by Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001) should be considered pre-
liminary because of the rather severe limitation of data then available. Separately,
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2002) examined the relationship between specific reg-
ulatory and supervisory practices and banking sector development, efficiency,
and fragility and found little evidence of any impact of official supervisory power
or bank activity restrictions on interest margins or NPLs.4
This paper reexamines the relationship between banking sector performance
and the quality of regulation and supervision, as measured by compliance with the
BCP. The basic question we address is whether following the BCP creates a regu-
latory and supervisory environment that helps improve banking sector perfor-
mance. We use two of the common measures of banking sector performance:
NPLs and net interest margin. The level of NPLs reflects the degree to which
3IMF and World Bank (2003) provides the most recent review of the FSAP program.
4In a recent related paper, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2003) examined the impact of bank
regulations, market structure, and national institutions on bank interest margins and overhead costs, and
concluded that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermedi-
ation, along with inflation. They also found, however, that bank regulations become insignificant when
controlling for indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection.
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banks are able to perform one of their basic functions, that is, collect the money
they lend. While there may be different reasons for an increase in NPLs, a high
level of NPLs almost universally indicates serious problems in the banking sector.
Net interest margin can be interpreted as a measure of the efficiency of banking
sector performance, because it indicates the cost of banking intermediation that
needs to be paid by banks’ customers.5
We use a new data set and different methodology than previous literature.
Using panel data from 1998 to 2002, we estimated a model explaining the varia-
tion of the ratio of NPLs across 65 countries that went through the BCP assess-
ment. Data from the 1998–2001 World Bank financial system structure database
were used to estimate a model of net interest margin for the same set of coun-
tries. We include an index of BCP compliance in both models to explore whether
BCP compliance has any measurable impact on banking sector performance
after taking into account other determinants of NPLs and net interest margin.
Our results suggest that a higher degree of compliance with the BCP has a
significant positive impact on asset quality of banks (as measured by the ratio of
NPLs), even after taking into account the level of development of the economy
and macroeconomic factors. We also find evidence that a higher degree of com-
pliance with the BCP is associated with lower net interest margin. An effort to
improve compliance with the BCP should therefore have a positive impact on
banking sector performance across countries.6
I. Models and Data Description
BCP Compliance
We constructed a simple index of overall BCP compliance from assessments con-
ducted mostly during FSAPs.7 We use detailed information about each assess-
ment, including a four-grade rating for each core principle.8 For the 65 countries
in our sample, we have assigned values to assessment grades—compliant (4),
largely compliant (3), materially noncompliant (2), and noncompliant (1).9 The
value of the index of overall compliance for a given country is equal to the sum
of ratings for individual core principles.10 Therefore, the actual values of the index
5Large net interest margins often indicate inefficient banking operations, high risks in lending, and
monopoly power of banks; thus, lower margins would be preferable. However, in some cases, overcom-
petition could temporarily depress margins so low that financial stability may be threatened.
6We effectively test a joint hypothesis that (i) the quality of banking supervision and regulation mat-
ters for the performance of the banking system, and (ii) the BCP and the assessments measure the relevant
features of quality of banking supervision and regulation. The theory does not offer a clear prediction of
the impact of more intensive regulation and supervision on bank performance; for a more detailed discus-
sion, see Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2002).
7A few assessments were conducted on a stand-alone basis.
8Appendix I provides the list of the Basel Core Principles. See IMF and World Bank (2002) and
Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001) for useful background on BCP assessments.
9The list of countries in our sample is provided in Appendix II.
10In several assessments, some Core Principles were either “not assessed” or “not applicable”; these
were assigned an average value of BCP compliance of other principles in a given country, so that these
countries were not penalized.
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of overall BCP compliance will be between 30 and 120, with higher values indi-
cating a higher degree of compliance.11
Our sample includes 13 advanced countries, 19 emerging market countries,
and 33 developing countries. Figure 1 confirms that advanced countries achieved
the highest level of BCP compliance, followed by emerging and developing coun-
tries. The variance of results, as measured by the difference between best and
worst results in each group, also increases from advanced countries to emerging
countries, and further to developing countries.
We also construct several subindices of BCP, using different groupings of the
Core Principles and using the same procedure as described above for the overall
BCP compliance. These include (1) objectives, autonomy, and powers of the
supervisor; (2) licensing and structure; (3) prudential regulations; (4) methods of
ongoing supervision; and (5) cross-border banking.12 The correlation matrix of
these subindices presented in Table 1 suggests that the assessment results of the
parts of BCP are rather closely correlated.
11We treat the six subcategories of Core Principle 1 (CP 1) as separate principles. This does not have
any significant impact on the index—the correlation coefficient of our index (with six subcategories treated
as separate principles) and an index with only one entry for CP 1 (equal to the average of the six subcate-
gories) is 0.991.












































1Error bars denote minimum and maximum observations.
Figure 1. Compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision (BCP) by Country Group1Richard Podpiera
310
A higher degree of compliance appears to be associated with lower NPLs and
narrower net interest margin. Figures 2 and 3 show that actual BCP compliance
exhibits a considerable variation in our sample, from the perfect score of 120 to a
rather low value of just over 50. The two measures of banking performance show
substantial variation across the sample. There appears to be a negative relationship
between BCP compliance and the two banking measures, with high compliance
being associated with more favorable outcomes—that is, lower NPLs and nar-
rower margins. This relationship appears to be tighter for countries with higher
compliance, because the dispersion of observations increases with decreasing
compliance—this holds for both NPLs and net interest margin.
Model of NPLs
We model the share of NPLs in total loans as a function of macroeconomic vari-
ables in previous years (economic growth, changes in inflation, real interest rates,
and exchange rates), a measure of compliance with BCP, and variables controlling
for the level of development of the economy (or of the financial sector):
for panel data i = 1, . . . , 65 countries, t = 1, . . . , 5 years (1998–2002), where
• bcp represents an index of compliance with the BCP (two different indices,
bcp_all, a measure of the overall compliance, and bcp_pru, a measure of
compliance with the core principles related to prudential regulations, Core
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix of Main BCP Components
Objectives, Licensing Cross-
Autonomy, and Prudential Methods of Border All Core
Powers Structure Regulations Supervision Banking Principles
Objectives, autonomy
powers (CP 1) 1.00 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.84
Licensing and structure 
(CP 2–5) 1.00 0.68 0.67 0.57 0.80
Prudential regulations
(CP 6–15) 1.00 0.84 0.54 0.93
Methods of supervision
(CP 16–20) 1.00 0.64 0.90
Cross-border banking
(CP 23–25) 1.00 0.73
All core principles 1.00
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 3. Net Interest Margin and Index of Overall BCP Compliance
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Principles 6–15).13 Only one observation of BCP compliance per country is
available (from one assessment for each country performed mostly from 1999
to 2001) and this is assumed to remain constant over the five years;14
• growth stands for the GDP growth; we include lagged growth (t−1) in the
model;
• cpi_ch denotes the change of consumer inflation in the previous two years;
• real_ir_ch denotes a change of real lending rates over the previous two years;
• exch_rate stands for the change the country’s exchange rate (we use a change
in the nominal exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar, exch, and a change in
the real effective exchange rate, reer); and
• development represents a variable capturing the level of development of the
country’s economy or its financial system. We use the level of GDP per capita
in purchasing power parity, ppp_gdp, as a measure of the level of development
of the economy (and a proxy for the development of the country’s legal and
financial system) as well as the ratio of M2 to GDP, m2/gdp, as a proxy for the
degree of development of the financial system.
The temporal structure of the model reflects the expectation that different
shocks will affect NPLs with different lags. Therefore, we include a contempora-
neous change in the exchange rate, real GDP growth with one lag, and changes in
inflation and real interest rates over two years. Appendix III provides information
on data sources.15
We expect the parameters β1, β2, and β6 to be negative, because higher com-
pliance with the BCP, higher economic growth, and higher level of economic (or
financial) development can be expected to have a positive impact on asset quality
in banks (that is, lower NPL ratios). Parameter β4 is expected to be positive,
because an increase of real interest rates would be expected to worsen asset quality,
making loan repayment more difficult. Parameters β3 and β5 could be either pos-
itive or negative, because the effect of accelerating inflation depends on whether its
acceleration was anticipated or not, the flexibility of lending rates, and whether the
acceleration signals general economic instability. For the exchange rate, the effect
depends on the composition of outstanding credit (that is, the size of unhedged
positions and the share of borrowers whose businesses benefit from a given change
13The BCP include CP 15 (Money Laundering) under Prudential Regulations and Requirements,
although it reflects market integrity rather than prudential requirements. We have calculated both indices,
with and without CP 15, and found that there is virtually no difference between them (correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.993). We use the official definition and include CP 15 in the prudential subindex.
14While this is clearly a limiting assumption,it appears reasonable because the level of BCP compliance—
particularly the practical application of the core principles—is unlikely to change quickly and it is likely
that there will be a substantial time lag before any impact of changed regulation and supervision becomes
observable in banking system performance.
15Data limitations prevented us from including a measure of government ownership and foreign owner-
ship in the financial system. This information is available in the database provided by Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2001), but only for one time and for fewer than 50 countries in our sample. Including these two
variables and using a limited sample (assuming the ownership data are constant across 1998–2002) did not
change the results to any substantial extent and only the government ownership variable was statistically
significant (and positive).
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in the exchange rate); large exchange rate movements can signal general economic
instability as well.
One of the econometric issues we face is the quality of NPL data. First, differ-
ences in definitions across countries can result in measurement errors. As long as
we can assume that the measurement error of the dependent variable is uncorrelated
with the regressor(s), it can be absorbed in the disturbance of the regression and
ignored. Second, the actual level of NPLs could be underreported in some coun-
tries, mostly in those with weak regulation and supervision. This would bias our
estimates of the impact of BCP compliance on NPLs downward, that is, against us
finding a significant relationship.16
Model of Net Interest Margin
The model of net interest margin explains the cross-country variation of the mar-
gin as a function of structural characteristics of the banking sector (overhead as an
indicator of operating costs, and ratio of NPLs as an indicator of lending risks), a
macroeconomic indicator (consumer price inflation) serving as a proxy of macro-
economic stability, a measure of compliance with BCP, and measures of the level
of development of the economy and of the financial system:
for panel data i = 1, . . . , 65 countries, t = 1, . . . , 4 years (1998–2001), where
• bcp represents an index of compliance with BCP, as in equation (1) (again, we
use both a measure of the overall compliance and a measure of compliance
with the prudential core principles);
• overhead stands for bank overhead costs as a share of total assets;
• npl denotes a ratio of nonperforming loans;
• cpi stands for the consumer price inflation; and
• development represents a variable capturing the level of development of
the country’s economy or its financial system. Here, we use (1) the level of
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, ppp_gdp; (2) the ratio of M2 to
GDP, m2/gdp; and (3) the total financial system deposits as a share of GDP,
all_dep/gdp.
We have also included a variable measuring the concentration of the banking
sector and assets of the three largest banks as a share of banking system total
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16For instance, assume that the true NPL ratio is npl* and we can only observe an underreported ratio
npl, with (i) a measurement error ξ independent of all other variables and the overall disturbance of the
regression; and (ii) underreporting proportional to our measure of the quality of banking regulation and
supervision (BCP). Then npl* = npl + ϕ (120 − bcp) + ξ for ϕ > 0, that is, the lower the quality, the higher
the underreporting. Denote the coefficient reflecting the impact of BCP compliance on npl* as β1 and
assume it is negative. If we use npl as the dependent variable in our regression instead of npl*, we actu-
ally estimate (β1 +ϕ ), a smaller coefficient in absolute value than if we could use npl* because β1<0 and
ϕ>0. The measurement error ξ will be absorbed in the disturbance of the regression.
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assets, but it was not significant in any regression and we excluded it from the final
model.17 Additional information about the data is provided in Appendix III.
We expect the parameters β2, β3, and β4 to be positive, with higher costs, higher
NPLs, and a less stable macroeconomic environment all increasing the net interest
margin that banks charge. The parameters β1 and β5, on the other hand, are expected
to be negative, as better regulation and supervision and a higher level of development
of the financial system should be associated with lower intermediation costs.
Econometric Issues
Several econometric issues had to be resolved, including (1) the potential endo-
genetity of bank regulation and supervision; (2) the choice of estimation method;
and (3) potential sample selectivity bias.
The potential endogeneity of bank regulation and supervision is an issue, and
we use instrumental variables to control for this problem. An effective instrumen-
tal variable needs to be correlated with the independent variable in question but
uncorrelated with the error term. We use two broad governance indices compiled
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003)—an index of government effective-
ness and an index of control of corruption. These indices are correlated with the
index of BCP compliance, yet they are broad enough relative to the dependent
variable to allow us to assume that they affect the dependent variable only through
bank regulation and supervision. We also test whether these two indices are not
rejected as valid instruments by the data (as described below).
The government effectiveness index is set up to measure the quality of public
service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants,
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to policies. The index of control of corruption
measures perceptions of corruption, with different measurement sources varying
from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done,” to the effects of
business corruption, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena.18
To estimate both models, we use a generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator that is robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation on the pooled
sample. This estimator allows us to test the validity of the instruments by impos-
ing the orthogonality conditions that the instrumental variables are not correlated
with the error term. The Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions can be
interpreted as a test of whether the instruments are associated with the level of
NPLs beyond their ability to explain compliance with the BCP (as a measure of
bank regulation and supervision). If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the
data do not reject the validity of the instruments.19
We also estimate two panel data models with an adjustment for heteroscedas-
ticity and the same instruments as above. These are (1) regression on country
17The same data limitations concerning government ownership and foreign ownership described for
the NPL model above apply here.
18For details, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003).
19The test statistic has chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom (for two instruments, that
is, two overidentifying restrictions).
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means over the sample period (a “between” estimator); and (2) a random effects
model, which assumes that the individual country intercepts are drawn from a com-
mon distribution.20 For the estimates of the random effects model to be consistent,
the individual intercepts cannot be correlated with independent variables. We test
this correlation through the Hausman test statistic (H0 = random effects).
The FSAP and stand-alone assessments of the BCP are voluntary, so it is pos-
sible that countries that would score poorly did not participate in the program,
which would create sample selectivity bias in our estimates. In reality, the decision
to participate is related to a number of factors, including peer pressure, coopera-
tion with the IMF in other areas (for example, through a program), and domestic
political issues. The range of observed compliance with the BCP in our sample is
relatively wide, so there does not appear to be a “cutoff” compliance below which
countries would opt out of the FSAP program or assessment.
Nevertheless, to explore the importance of the sample selectivity problem,
we have followed the Heckman two-step procedure (for more details see, for
instance, Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). First, assuming that a “reservation
compliance rating” exists, below which countries opt out of the assessment and
above which they participate, we have enlarged our sample to include countries
for which BCP assessment was not undertaken. Given data availability in the IMF
International Financial Statistics database, our enlarged sample consists of 126
countries, including the 65 countries in our original sample. We have then esti-
mated a probit model explaining the availability of BCP assessment for the
enlarged sample, using macroeconomic variables (GDP growth and inflation), the
level of development (income level per capital in purchasing power parity, PPP),
and an indirect indication of the quality of banking supervision (the incidence of
banking crises from 1995 to 2002).21 Second, based on the probit estimates, we
have calculated the Heckman selectivity regressor (inverse Mills ratio) and incor-
porated it into our models of NPLs and the net interest margin to test whether
selectivity is indeed a problem in our data set.22
II. Results
The estimation results for the nonperforming loans model, presented in Table 2, sug-
gest that compliance with the BCP is indeed associated with a lower share of NPLs.23
20We also run the basic pooled regression (equivalent to the model estimated by GMM). The fact that
we have only one observation for BCP compliance does not allow us to estimate a fixed-effects model in
which the parameter at the BCP compliance variable would be identified. This also implies that the co-
efficient at the BCP index could reflect the differences in means across countries not picked up by other
explanatory variables. We have tried to address this problem by including a variable reflecting early par-
ticipation in an FSAP, which could capture unobserved characteristics of the countries in our sample. The
variable was statistically significant only in some model specifications and did not significantly change the
estimates of the BCP coefficients.
21For the definition of banking crises, we have used the data from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine
(2004), who updated the data prepared by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). The sources of other
data for the enlarged sample are the same as for the original sample; see Appendix III for more details.
22The Heckman two-step procedure provides both a correction and a test of the selectivity bias problem.
23The Hausman test rejected the validity of the random effects model in almost all specifications, so



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates of the parameter β1 are statistically significant and negative, implying that
higher observance of the BCP is associated with lower NPLs. This holds for overall
compliance and compliance with prudential core principles.24 The difference in
magnitude of estimated coefficients is due to the different scale of the two indices.
Most other parameter estimates have the expected sign. Higher growth in pre-
vious years helps reduce NPLs, but an increase of real interest rates and an accel-
eration of inflation worsen bank asset quality, as measured by NPLs. The impact
of nominal exchange rate depreciation appears to be negative, that is, a deprecia-
tion would have a negative impact on asset quality (higher NPLs). The exchange
rate results suggest that, in our sample, the negative impact of a depreciation on
asset quality because of unhedged positions is greater than its positive impact on
borrowers benefiting from a weaker currency (exporters and producers of trad-
able goods).25
Countries with higher GDP per capita tend to have lower NPLs. GDP per
capita expressed in PPP, used as a proxy for an overall financial and economic
development, is a significant explanatory variable, and the parameter estimates have
the expected negative sign. A somewhat more direct measure of financial sector
development, m2/gdp, was not statistically significant.
Overall, the models provide a reasonably good explanation of cross-country
variation in the share of NPLs. The models that attempt to explain variation across
all available observations (pooled sample model) explain more than 30 percent of
the variation, whereas the “between” estimator explains more than 40 percent of
the variation of country means.
The estimation results for the net interest margin model are similar. The results
of the GMM-estimated pooled sample model, presented in Table 3, suggest that a
higher level of BCP compliance does help reduce intermediation costs (net interest
margin). However, the BCP compliance coefficients in the model of country means
are not statistically significant, although they have the expected sign.
Most other parameter estimates in table 3 have the expected sign and are sta-
tistically significant. Higher overhead costs clearly contribute to higher net inter-
est margins, as does higher inflation. Also, a higher degree of development of the
economy or the financial system as measured by GDP per capita is associated
with lower net interest margins.26 However, the estimated coefficient for the
impact of NPLs does not have the expected sign. This is difficult to explain, but
it could be partly caused by the fact that it is the future probability of default that
is being priced in the net interest margin, while the indicator of NPLs largely
looks backward. The explanatory power of the models is rather good, as they
explain 70–75 percent of the variation in net interest margins.
24Similar results were obtained using some other subcomponents of the BCP described in Table 1: CPs 1–5
(objectives, autonomy, power, resources, licensing, and structure), CPs 16–20 (methods of ongoing super-
vision), and CPs 23–25 (cross-border banking).
25The real exchange rate was not significant in virtually any specification. We therefore included the
nominal exchange rate measure in the final model.
26Higher m2/gdp and the ratio of total financial system deposits to GDP were also associated with a
lower net interest margin (when substituted for GDP per capita). We also included a measure of concen-
tration of the banking sector into the model, but it was not statistically significant.
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Because the Heckman selectivity regressor was not significant in either model,
it appears that self-selection is not a major problem in our sample. We have
explored the stability of the coefficients relative to sample selection by randomly
dropping the observations for five countries and reestimating the pooled sample
model by GMM. The results appear to be rather robust, as the magnitude of the esti-
mates remained approximately the same and they remained statistically significant.
Because our sample overlaps only partially with that of Sundararajan, Marston, and
Basu (2001) and our methodology is considerably different, we were unable to
compare the results more directly.27
In most cases, the null hypothesis of the test of overidentifying restrictions was
not rejected, implying that the data do not reject the validity of the instruments. We
have also confirmed, by a least-squares regression with instruments entered directly
as right-hand-side variables, that the instruments do not have a direct explanatory
power in most model specifications.
To explore whether the relationship between BCP compliance and the depen-
dent variables is primarily driven by one type of country, we have estimated the
models on two subsamples of approximately equal size: (1) advanced and emerg-
ing markets and (2) developing countries. The results were not very strong, possi-
bly also because of a lower number of observations in the regressions. For NPLs,
the results did suggest that the relationship may be stronger for advanced and
emerging markets; for these, the BCP coefficient was statistically significant and
larger than in the regression for the whole sample, whereas for developing coun-
tries, the coefficient was smaller and statistically insignificant. For net interest
margin, neither subsample yielded a statistically significant BCP coefficient.28
III. Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship between banking sector performance and the
quality of regulation and supervision as measured by compliance with the BCP.
We use a new data set and different methodology than the initial attempt by
Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001). BCP assessment results for 65 countries
are used, along with 1998–2002 panel data for NPLs and other explanatory vari-
ables. For the net interest margin, we use 1998–2001 data from the World Bank
financial system structure database.
We find a direct positive effect of compliance with the BCP on banking sec-
tor performance, as measured by the share of NPLs and the net interest margin.
Higher compliance with the BCP is associated with lower NPLs and lower net
interest margin, suggesting that following the BCP creates a regulatory and super-
visory environment that helps improve banking sector performance.
27Our sample includes 24 of the 35 countries listed by Sundararajan, Marston, and Basu (2001), partly
because of the exclusion of several very early assessments from our sample. These were done before the
assessment methodology was fully developed. Another factor complicating the replication of their sample
is the fact that, according to the reported results, only 24–29 countries were actually used in the estimation.
28Details are available from the author upon request.
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Our understanding of the interaction between banking regulation and super-
vision and banking sector performance and development is far from complete and
there is substantial room for further research. Important data limitations continue
to pose problems—most important, the lack of consistent data on regulation and
supervision over time, which, if available, would make it possible to make full use
of panel data techniques and explore the impact of changes in regulation and super-
vision on the banking sector.
APPENDIX I
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
C1 Chapter 1. Objectives, Autonomy, Powers, and Resources (CP 1)
CP1 Principle 1. Objectives, Autonomy, Powers, and Resources
SP11 Principle 1(1). An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsi-
bilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of banks.
SP12 Principle 1(2). Each such agency should possess operational independence and ade-
quate resources.
SP13 Principle 1(3). A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary,
including provisions relating to authorization of banking establishments and their
ongoing supervision.
SP14 Principle 1(4). A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary,
including powers to address compliance with laws, as well as safety and soundness
concerns.
SP15 Principle 1(5). A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary,
including legal protection for supervisors.
SP16 Principle 1(6). Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and pro-
tecting the confidentiality of such information should be in place.
C2 Chapter 2. Licensing and Structure (CPs 2–5)
CP2 Principle 2. Permissible Activities
CP3 Principle 3. Licensing Criteria
CP4 Principle 4. Ownership
CP5 Principle 5. Investment Criteria
C3 Chapter 3. Prudential Regulations and Requirements (CPs 6–15)
CP6 Principle 6. Capital Adequacy
CP7 Principle 7. Credit Policies
CP8 Principle 8. Loan Evaluation and Loan-Loss Provisioning
CP9 Principle 9. Large Exposure Limits
CP10 Principle 10. Connected Lending
CP11 Principle 11. Country Risk
CP12 Principle 12. Market Risks
CP13 Principle 13. Other Risks
CP14 Principle 14. Internal Control and Audit
CP15 Principle 15. Money Laundering
C4 Chapter 4. Methods of Ongoing Supervision (CPs 16–20)
CP16 Principle 16. On-Site and Off-Site Supervision
CP17 Principle 17. Bank Management Contact
CP18 Principle 18. Off-Site SupervisionCOMPLIANCE WITH BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES
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CP19 Principle 19. Validation of Supervisory Information
CP20 Principle 20. Consolidated Supervision
C5 Chapter 5. Information Requirements (CP 21)
CP21 Principle 21. Accounting Standards
C6 Chapter 6. Formal Powers of Supervisors (CP 22)
CP22 Principle 22. Remedial Measures
C7 Chapter 7. Cross-Border Banking (CP 23–25)
CP23 Principle 23. Globally Consolidated Supervision
CP24 Principle 24. Host Country Supervision
CP25 Principle 25. Supervision over Foreign Banks’ Establishments
APPENDIX II






































































npl—gross nonperforming loans as a share of total gross loans; source: provisional Monetary
and Financial Systems Department’s Financial Soundness Indicators database, original data
from Financial Sector Assessment Programs, IMF’s Economic Data Sharing System, and
central banks’ publications;
growth—real GDP growth; source: International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF staff reports
where IFS data were missing;
cpi_ch—a change of consumer price inflation in percentage points over the previous two years,
that is, cpit- cpit-2; source: IFS, IMF staff reports where IFS data were missing;
real_ir_ch—a change of real lending rates in percentage points over the previous two years,
that is, real_irt- real_irt2; ex post consumer price inflation used to estimate real lending rate;
source: nominal lending rates obtained from IFS;
exch—an annual change in the nominal exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar, source: IFS;
reer—an annual change in the real effective exchange rate; source: mostly IFS, IMF staff
reports to replace missing data;
ppp_gdp—the level of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) in U.S. dollar; source:
William Davidson Institute Database; available only through 2001, so the 2001 data were
used for 2002 GDP at PPP as well;
m2/gdp—the ratio of M2 (money + quasi money) to nominal GDP; source: IFS;
margin—net interest margin, an accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a share of
its interest-bearing (total earning) assets; source: World Bank Financial Structure Database;
original data from Fitch’s Bankscope database;
overhead—an accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a share of its total assets; source:
World Bank Financial Structure Database; original data from Fitch’s Bankscope database;
concentr—assets of the three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks in the sys-
tem; source: World Bank Financial Structure Database; original data from Fitch’s Bankscope
database;
cpi—annual consumer price inflation; source: IFS;
all_dep/gdp—demand, time, and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other financial insti-
tutions as a share of GDP, calculated using the following deflation method: {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et +
Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt /P_at] where F is demand and time and saving deposits, P_e is end-of
period consumer price inflation, and P_a is average annual consumer price inflation; source:
World Bank Financial Structure Database; original data from IFS.
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